On 11 June 2019, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) published an updated and reframed public “Consultation on transfers for processing”. The reframed consultation replaces a 9 April 2019, OPC consultation on transborder dataflows that proposed a requirement to obtain consent from Canadian individuals when transferring their personal information to foreign jurisdictions.

A contributing factor that led to the reframing of the consultation was the announcement of Canada’s Digital Charter by the Canadian Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED). Alongside this announcement, ISED released a white paper entitled “Strengthening Privacy for the Digital Age”, which puts forward general proposals for amending Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), including as it relates to enhancing individuals’ control, enabling responsible innovation and enhancing enforcement and oversight. The Centre for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL) responded to the OPC’s previous consultation on this topic and welcomes the opportunity to provide further input through the comments below.

**Comments**

According to the OPC, the purpose of the reframed discussion document is to obtain stakeholder views on how a future law should provide effective privacy protection for cross-border flows of personal information, as well as how PIPEDA, as currently drafted, should be interpreted in respect of transfers for processing personal information. CIPL will focus on each overarching question in turn:

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5 CIPL is a global data privacy and cybersecurity think tank in the law firm of Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP and is financially supported by the law firm and 77 member companies that are leaders in key sectors of the global economy. CIPL’s mission is to engage in thought leadership and develop best practices that ensure both effective privacy protections and the responsible use of personal information in the modern information age. CIPL’s work facilitates constructive engagement between business leaders, privacy and security professionals, regulators and policymakers around the world. For more information, please see CIPL’s website at [http://www.informationpolicycentre.com/](http://www.informationpolicycentre.com/). Nothing in this submission should be construed as representing the views of any individual CIPL member company or of the law firm of Hunton Andrews Kurth.

I. Longer Term – Future Law

Under the reframed consultation, the OPC suggests that PIPEDA “be amended to require demonstrable accountability, including an authority for the OPC to proactively inspect the practices of organizations to ensure they truly are accountable”.7

As an initial point, CIPL believes that an approach to cross-border data transfers that relies on accountability for transferred data is both viable and preferable for the optimal functioning of the modern digital economy and for the effective protection of individuals. CIPL has previously commended Canada for adopting such an approach to data transfers.8 More generally, CIPL has long supported the concept of organizational accountability to deliver effective privacy protections for individuals while facilitating the responsible use of and flows of data.9 One of the critical components of implementing accountability effectively is being able to demonstrate the existence and effectiveness of a privacy compliance program on request to regulators. Such programs can comprise customized internal privacy management programs designed by the organization itself or participation in formally recognized accountability schemes.

Moreover, CIPL notes that organizational accountability is not self-regulation and is very much an enforceable concept. Without addressing the question of whether the OPC currently has sufficient powers or should be given additional powers, regulators, including the OPC, must, of course, have sufficient authority to investigate and enforce effectively against noncompliance. And organizations must be required to stand ready to demonstrate accountability and to produce evidence of measures they have taken to be accountable.

Under a future law, proposals for which are currently being considered by the Canadian government through ISED, the OPC recommends that serious consideration should be given to the adoption of standard contractual clauses, as it would add another level of review to international transfers by the OPC. CIPL cautions against adopting standard contractual clauses. CIPL believes that incorporating standard contractual clauses in the same way that the European Union has done to date will raise additional significant challenges for organizations transferring personal information across borders without adding any additional protections to individuals.

7 Supra note 1 at page 2.
Of course, the use of commercial contracts (as opposed to standard contractual clauses) to transfer data across borders is generally very effective to ensure that legal obligations that attach to personal information in one jurisdiction travel with the data as it moves outside of the country. One of the reasons that contracts have proven to be effective for organizations is that they are customizable to the specific data transaction and context at hand. Data flows occur within varying and specific business contexts and the transferor and transferee of data must retain flexibility to use contractual language that suits their specific business needs and information flows while imposing appropriate data privacy and security obligations applicable to the data.

However, under the current EU approach to using standard contractual clauses, parties to a data transfer are required to use non-modifiable standard contracts, which may not always be appropriate to the context of the data transfer involved. This has resulted in many businesses putting in place multiple contracts—one that meets the parties’ individual data processing needs (i.e. commercial contracts) and one to “tick-the-box” of regulatory compliance (i.e. standard contractual clauses). This is wholly inefficient, can further complicate data transactions and does nothing to protect individuals and their data. Organizations should be able to adapt and tailor contracts to the needs of the data transaction so long as they comply with and implement the relevant data protection requirements.

Another, perhaps more effective, method of ensuring an additional layer of review to international transfers of personal information is through recognizing in any future law, and encouraging the use of, cross-border privacy rules, certifications and seals. One prominent and successful example is a formal accountability scheme known as the APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system, developed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The CBPR are a voluntary yet enforceable corporate code of conduct or certification mechanism for intra- and intercompany cross-border data transfers that have been reviewed and certified by an approved third-party certification organization (i.e. Accountability Agent). The Accountability Agent provides an additional layer of review to transfers of personal information (by way of the certification process, the annual recertification and its complaint handling and dispute resolution requirements), thereby promoting trust, and would remove frontline oversight burdens from the regulators who can then use their resources on other regulatory and enforcement priorities.

In fact, Canada was one of the first countries to join the CBPR system and currently participates alongside seven other APEC countries. To date, however, Canada has not identified an Accountability Agent to effectuate its participation. Doing so would allow its businesses to participate in this system. Indeed, the CBPR ensure that the CBPR-certified company remains liable for the protection of the information at the level of the originating APEC country and the CBPR, regardless of where or to whom the data is transferred. Making full use of this system under any new future privacy law would fully align with the OPC’s view of requiring demonstrable accountability for the transfer of personal information across borders.

Furthermore, there may also be an important role for other codes of conduct, certifications, privacy marks and seals to play in ensuring accountable transfers of personal information from Canada. Related to the concept of the CBPR, such mechanisms can be used to impose on organizations substantive privacy requirements that are externally verified by third-party Accountability Agents or other certifying bodies and be made fully enforceable by the OPC.
Finally, the OPC outlines several cases where it believes that consent may be an appropriate way of protecting individuals against the transfer of information that could potentially be used against them, for instance information about legal activities in Canada that are considered illegal elsewhere. CIPL believes that requiring consent in such cases is impracticable for the reasons consent generally cannot be a solution in this context, as further described in the next section. Any new privacy law should not include a consent requirement for transborder data flows.

| Finally, the OPC outlines several cases where it believes that consent may be an appropriate way of protecting individuals against the transfer of information that could potentially be used against them, for instance information about legal activities in Canada that are considered illegal elsewhere. CIPL believes that requiring consent in such cases is impracticable for the reasons consent generally cannot be a solution in this context, as further described in the next section. Any new privacy law should not include a consent requirement for transborder data flows. |

In summary, CIPL agrees with the OPC’s overarching long-term view to protect transfers of personal information across borders through an accountability model backed up by appropriate enforcement authority. An accountability-based approach has served Canada well over the past decade and while the 2017 Equifax breach 10 raised some questions, CIPL believes that with appropriate enhancement, fine-tuning and enforcement, accountability will continue to be the best model to ensure responsible flows of personal information outside of Canada and the effective protection of individuals.

II. Shorter Term – Current Law

As an initial matter, CIPL respectfully suggests that the OPC maintain the 2009 Guidelines for Processing Personal Data Across Borders (2009 Guidelines) 11 and refrain from adopting a new interpretation unless directed by the legislature. The OPC’s proposed interpretation requiring consent for cross-border data transfers equates to a significant change in Canada’s privacy regime that should be left to the Canadian Parliament.

Under the reframed consultation, the OPC maintains its previous position that individuals should be asked for consent when their personal information will be transferred to foreign jurisdictions, even if only to be processed by third-party service providers. This change in position resulted from the OPC’s investigation into Equifax Inc. and Equifax Canada Co.’s compliance with PIPEDA in light of its 2017 data breach of personal information. 12

With respect to cross-border data transfers under PIPEDA, as currently drafted, CIPL stands by the comments submitted in its response to the previous version of this consultation. 13 The OPC’s 2009 Guidelines currently inform the OPC’s position on transferring personal information outside of Canada. The 2009 Guidelines state that organizations must ensure through contractual or other means that data transferred from Canada to a service provider in another jurisdiction continues to be protected at a level that is comparable to the level at which it would be protected should it remain within the organization sending the data. Organizations do not have to obtain consent from individuals to transfer the data but,

10 Infra note 12.
13 Supra note 6.
rather, are held accountable for what happens to the personal data they transfer and must ensure that their service providers deliver adequate protection regardless of where they are located.

This accountability-based model has served Canada well. It has cemented Canada’s reputation as a pioneer and leader in promoting organizational accountability. It has also been widely regarded as a pragmatic and effective governance model for cross-border data transfers, demonstrating a compelling alternative to more cumbersome approaches that rely on a combination of transfer restrictions and various rationales and mechanisms to get around them. While consent does not fit squarely into these more cumbersome models (as further discussed below), and it may make sense for consent to be a legal basis for transferring data in certain limited circumstances (such as those contemplated by the GDPR, as discussed below), laws should not require consent for all or routine transfers, as this will not contribute to better protection or empowerment of individuals with respect to their personal information. Instead, it will introduce an unnecessary obstacle to transborder data flows without countervailing benefits. CIPL strongly recommends against the proposed changes to the OPC’s 2009 Guidelines, for the reasons set forth in greater detail below.

A. The OPC’s Rationale for Requiring Consent

In its original consultation, the OPC points out that under PIPEDA, the consent requirement applies to all collection, use or disclosure of personal data. Since a cross-border transfer involves the “disclosure” of personal data to a third-party in a foreign jurisdiction, the OPC argues that consent to cross-border transfers is required as a “matter of law”. According to the OPC, nothing in PIPEDA exempts cross-border transfers from the consent requirement. The OPC also supports its argument for consent with the notion that “individuals would generally expect to know whether and where their personal information may be transferred or otherwise disclosed to an organization outside Canada”.

However, CIPL believes that:

1. there is no apparent mandate under PIPEDA to require consent for transfers, whether they be domestic or cross border (if there were, a public consultation on that point would not be warranted);
2. transparency and consent are two distinct elements. Transparency with respect to cross-border transfers is already required under the 2009 Guidelines, and any lack of transparency should be addressed through separate means, rather than requiring consent;
3. any problems with the existing accountability-based approach to transfers should be addressed by clarifying, enhancing and/or ensuring proper enforcement of this approach; and

15 Supra note 2.
16 Id.
17 CIPL’s comments will not address in detail the legal arguments under PIPEDA.
(4) there are several clear factual, policy and legal reasons against the proposed change in interpretation of PIPEDA.

B. Reasons for Not Creating a Consent Requirement for Cross-border Transfers

1. Requiring consent does not add protections to individuals

It is not clear how a consent requirement will add any privacy protections to individuals. In its original consultation, the OPC notes that the current accountability requirements will continue, even where the individual has given his or her consent to the transfer. In the reframed consultation, the OPC further notes that accountability and consent are separate principles under PIPEDA and that no one principle excludes the application of others. Under the current “accountability” approach, personal information already has to be protected at the Canadian level. A consent requirement adds nothing to that protection.

Secondly, an individual who does not consent to transfers that are inherent in the transaction or the organization’s business model is left with the choice of not doing business with that organization. As the OPC notes in its original consultation, “organizations are free to design their operations to include flows of personal information across borders, but they must respect individuals’ right to make that choice for themselves as part of the consent process”. Thus, “individuals cannot dictate to an organization that it must design its operations in such a way that their personal information must stay in Canada [...], but organizations cannot dictate to individuals that their personal information will cross borders unless, with meaningful information, they consent to this”. Significantly, the OPC concludes that “whether this affects [the individual’s] decision to enter into a business relationship with an organization or to forego a product or service should be left to the discretion of the individual”.

This result is substantially the same as under the 2009 Guidelines, which essentially provide that (a) the fact of a cross-border transfer must be disclosed to individuals and (b) once an individual has chosen to proceed with doing business with the organization, he or she does “not have an additional right to refuse to have their information transferred”. In short, it appears that under both the 2009 Guidelines and the current proposal, the individual can choose not to proceed with the transaction based on the information that his or her personal data may be transferred to a foreign jurisdiction, but he or she cannot prevent the transfer from happening and still obtain the product or service. In addition to the general absence of a privacy-enhancing choice in this schema, there is the potential for actively undermining privacy protections because cross-border transfers to cloud providers whose core business is to provide a secure environment may actually result in better security than is available domestically. Accordingly, an explicit consent requirement does not increase an individual’s privacy protections.

2. Any existing problems could be addressed by strengthening organizational accountability

While the OPC has indicated in both the supplemental discussion document to the original consultation\(^{18}\) and the reframed consultation that the present policy proposal is a reaction to the 2017 Equifax breach and subsequent OPC investigation, it did not outline any specific insufficiencies of the current accountability-based approach. The reframed consultation document simply states “[...] as we have seen

in Equifax, PIPEDA’s current formulation of the accountability principle is not always effective in protecting privacy”.

CIPL believes that if there are specific insufficiencies in the current accountability-based approach, these insufficiencies should be clearly identified and explained. This, in turn, would enable strengthening the current approach. Such strengthening may include (a) clarifying the existing accountability requirements that are designed to ensure continued comparable protection in transfer contexts (for instance transparency,\textsuperscript{19} data security, due diligence and audits in selecting processors and service providers, clarifying and enhancing contractual commitments relating to comparable privacy and security, and reliance on certifications (such as APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules)), (b) instituting policies and incentives that would increase organizational accountability among Canadian organizations and (c) enforcement of the relevant accountability measures.\textsuperscript{20}

3. **Requiring explicit consent would be burdensome for both individuals and businesses, would confuse individuals and reduce privacy protections and, in some cases, would be impossible**

The problems associated with over-reliance on consent are widely known and discussed in detail elsewhere\textsuperscript{21} and do not have to be elaborated here. Given these problems and the resulting consent fatigue among individuals, adding yet another consent requirement where none is needed will further aggravate the problems. Under the 2009 Guidelines, individuals already receive information about the fact of cross-border transfers and already are able to stop any transactions with the business if they do not want their personal information transferred. The only new element would be to make consent explicit in some contexts, but without any difference in outcome for the individual. To the extent there is a marginal benefit associated with this change, it is outweighed by significant downsides, including the following:

- Asking for consent for all cross-border transfers is confusing to individuals. Requiring this type of consent could mislead people to think that there might be something inherently risky or wrong with such transfers. Given the realities of the modern global digital economy where such transfers are commonplace, routine and necessary, this is the wrong message to send to individuals. The OPC itself even notes in the section on “What Should Individuals Expect” in the 2009 Guidelines that individuals should “[r]ecognize that transborder flows of information are a fact of life and are

\textsuperscript{19} It seems that the OPC’s proposal is conflating transparency with consent in the consultation in that the principal purpose of the new consent requirement would be to demonstrate that individuals have been made aware of the cross-border transfers. To the extent there is evidence for flaws in the current approach to transparency on this point, the remedy would appear to involve clarifying the transparency requirements.
\textsuperscript{20} See CIPL papers on accountability in note 9 above.
very common”. It is likely that in the 10 years since then, individuals’ awareness of global interconnectedness and data flows has only increased.

- Asking for consent obfuscates the fact that an organization already has a separate and clear legal obligation to protect the personal data essentially at the Canadian level regardless of whether it remains in Canada or moves to another jurisdiction.

- Given how much personal data is routinely transferred across borders in the modern digital and global economy, being asked to consent to every transfer dramatically increases the number of consent requests. This would further burden individuals and have the effect of diluting and undermining the effectiveness of consent in situations where it would be meaningful.

- Requiring consent for all transfers may result in the unintended consequence of lowering organizations’ vigilance vis-à-vis the transferred personal data. For example, it could create the impression that an organization’s obligation ends with having obtained consent rather than having complied with the necessary accountability requirements to ensure ongoing comparable protections. In effect, it creates an illusory defense for less than accountable organizations. There is a fitting description of this scenario (and the one in the previous bullet) in one of the discussion papers that form part of Canada’s Department of Justice’s current technical engagement with experts on the future of the Privacy Act:

  [M]odels based on consent can effectively and inappropriately ‘offload’ an important accountability measure and responsibility from well-resourced organizations to overburdened individuals. Individuals may be ill-placed to meaningfully understand, question and decide issues that arise in relation to the myriad consents they may be asked to provide[].

- A new consent requirement for transfers would also impose significant burdens on organizations that would have to implement the mechanisms and procedures associated with it and could cause substantial cost and disruption to businesses. In addition, a consent requirement could create disincentives for businesses in Canada—particularly smaller ones—migrating to cloud and other online services. It could force major overhauls of how and where an organization processes personal data, which can have far-reaching impacts, particularly for multinational organizations of all sizes whose global affiliates often combine their processing activities in one jurisdiction, or for smaller Canadian affiliates of larger global companies who typically process their personal information outside of Canada. Businesses whose normal processes rely on transfers to providers in foreign jurisdictions would now face unpredictable and unnecessary failures to consent by Canadian individuals, forcing these businesses to either repatriate entire data sets to Canada (which frequently will be impossible where they are sharing one third-party service provider with their international affiliates) or lose Canadian customers and the benefit of using Canadian personal information. This will result in significant negative effects on productivity, efficiency and any number of additional advantages associated with processing operations outside of Canada,

including better information security in many cases. Ultimately, this is certain to undermine the global competitiveness of Canadian businesses.

- Even limiting a consent requirement to certain contexts identified by the OPC in which Canadian personal information might pertain to Canadian activities that are not legal in a transferee jurisdiction and where, therefore, the Canadian individual may be subjected to risk when such information is transferred to such foreign jurisdiction also is unworkable for the same reasons stated above.

- In some cases, it is impossible to obtain consent at all for a transfer due an organization's lack of relationship and/or contact information of an individual whose personal data is being transferred. This is particularly common in outsourcing models and the provision of services related to fighting financial crime, where an organization does not have a direct relationship with the individual in question.

- The ISED white paper on “Strengthening Privacy for the Digital Age” suggests reducing “consent fatigue” by not requiring consent in the context of “common business practices”, including “sharing information with third-party processors”, which is the opposite of what the OPC is proposing.23

4. The EU General Data Protection Regulation models a contrary view on the use of consent for cross-border transfers from the OPC's proposal

Even the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) enables information transfers without relying on individual consent, save in very narrow circumstances that are not envisioned by the OPC’s proposal. The OPC’s proposal thus is inconsistent with the GDPR and would also be an outlier among transfer regimes globally.

Under the GDPR, data may be transferred to a third country, or a territory or a sector within a country, or an international organization, that has been found to be “adequate” by the EU Commission. Alternatively, the GDPR provides for a number of “appropriate safeguards” that, if applied by an organization, legitimize cross-border information transfers, some of which correspond to the steps a Canadian organization currently would have to take to ensure the ongoing protection of information at a “comparable” level when it is transferred to another country. Only in cases in which the transfer is not pursuant to an adequacy finding, no appropriate safeguards are available and the individual has been informed of the possible risks of the transfer in light of the absence of adequacy or safeguards does the GDPR allow for explicit consent as a basis for transfer.

Indeed, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has noted that it expects companies to interpret the derogations (including consent) from the general transfer mechanisms narrowly.24 Recital 11 of the GDPR says that these “derogations for specific situations” apply to transfers that are “occasional”. In contrast, the OPC’s proposal would apply to constant, ongoing and routine transfers. Consistent with the intended narrow application of these derogations, consent is rarely used as a transfer basis under the GDPR.

23 Supra note 4 paper at page 6.
Accordingly, the GDPR models an approach that does not rely on consent as a legitimizing tool for cross-border transfers where other “appropriate safeguards” are available to ensure ongoing comparable protection for personal information. Clearly, no data controller would ever transfer personal data to a processor outside of Canada without a contract setting forth the necessary protections that apply to the data under Canadian law. Thus, the ostensible scenario for which the OPC seeks to introduce consent (even if limited to high-risk transfers as discussed by the OPC) is not one in which no other appropriate safeguards are available, putting the OPC’s proposal to introduce consent for cross-border transfers at odds with the GDPR.

5. Requiring consent is inconsistent with the APEC Privacy Framework and the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules

Canada is part of APEC, has helped develop and endorsed the APEC Privacy Framework (Framework), and has helped develop and joined the APEC CBPR system. In addition, the OPC is a participant in the APEC Cross-border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA), whose principal purpose is to enable backstop enforcement of the CBPR by Privacy Enforcement Authorities in the participating APEC economies.

One of the core objectives of the APEC Privacy Framework is to ensure the free flow of data in the Asia-Pacific region and to promote “effective privacy protections that avoid barriers to information flows”.\(^{25}\)

The Framework specifically calls out the role of the CBPR in furthering both privacy and maintaining information flows among APEC economies and with their trading partners, as well as in encouraging organizational accountability with respect to personal information.\(^{26}\) Indeed, one of the foundational premises of the Framework was to create “conditions, in which information can flow safely and accountably, for instance through the use of the CBPR system”. According to the Framework, the CBPR system was created so that “individuals may trust that the privacy of their personal information is protected” no matter where it flows.\(^ {27}\)

An APEC Privacy Framework\(^ {28}\) section specifically on cross-border transfers provides as follows:

69. A member economy should refrain from restricting cross border flows of personal information between itself and another member economy where (a) the other economy has in place legislative or regulatory instruments that give effect to the Framework or (b) sufficient safeguards exist, including effective enforcement mechanisms and appropriate measures (such as the CBPR) put in place by the personal information controller to ensure a continuing level of protection consistent with the Framework and the laws or policies that implement it.

70. Any restrictions to cross border flows of personal information should be proportionate to the risks presented by the transfer, taking into account the

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\(^{26}\) Id. at Preamble, section 8.

\(^{27}\) Id. at Part IV, B, III, paragraphs 65 and 67.

\(^ {28}\) Id. at Part IV, B, IV paragraphs 69 and 70.
Further, it is noteworthy (but not surprising) that the program requirements of the CBPR do not provide for choice or individual consent with respect to cross-border data transfers. Such an option would be inconsistent with APEC’s and the CBPR’s premise of providing accountability-based protections to the information regardless of geographic location.29

The OPC’s proposal to introduce a consent requirement, therefore, is inconsistent with the goals of the Framework and the specific purpose and requirements of the CBPR: to make geographic location of personal information irrelevant because protections should flow with the information regardless of where it goes. Given that under the OPC’s current transfer framework sufficient protections and appropriate measures already exist (and could be improved if they didn’t), and given that a consent requirement addresses no additional risks nor adds protections, such additional obstacle to cross-border transfers is clearly not proportionate.

While the Framework and the CBPR explicitly do not prohibit domestic privacy protections that go above and beyond what is provided by APEC, implementing a new requirement so at odds with the very premise of the APEC Privacy Framework and the CBPR warrants careful consideration. Our recommendation would be to strengthen the current accountability-based protections for transferred data, including through active implementation and promotion of the CBPR in Canada, rather than introducing a new consent requirement. Part of the promise of the CBPR is to harmonize privacy and data protection practices across the APEC region. This will be one of the principal benefits and incentives for organizations that certify to the CBPR. Any unnecessary national deviation, therefore, has the potential to directly undermine this harmonization benefit and, thus, the relevance and effectiveness of the CBPR in the long run.

In addition, as noted on page 3 of this submission, making full use of the CBPR system (and other formal accountability schemes based on codes of conduct and certifications) under any new future privacy law would fully align with the OPC’s long-term view of requiring demonstrable accountability for the transfer of personal information across borders. Furthermore, the role of Canadian CBPR Accountability Agents and other third-party certifiers would provide an additional layer of review to transfers of personal information outside of Canada.

29 There is one limited exception to this. The Framework’s accountability principle (Part III, principle IX, para. 32 plus Commentary) provides that where personal information in a domestic or international transfer cannot be protected through exercise of due diligence or other reasonable steps, an organization should obtain consent “to assure that the information is being protected consistent with these principles”. However, this would not be the context under the CBPR or, importantly, under Canada’s current requirement of transferring personal data subject to the appropriate accountability measures that ensure continued protection at the appropriate level. (It is also not clear how consent would assure the information is protected where the transferring organization has no way to protect the information itself).
6. Requiring consent is inconsistent with the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows

The OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows provides as follows:

**PART FOUR. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION: FREE FLOW AND LEGITIMATE RESTRICTIONS**

16. A data controller remains accountable for personal data under its control without regard to the location of the data.

17. A Member country should refrain from restricting transborder flows of personal data between itself and another country where (a) the other country substantially observes these Guidelines or (b) sufficient safeguards exist, including effective enforcement mechanisms and appropriate measures put in place by the data controller, to ensure a continuing level of protection consistent with these Guidelines.

18. Any restrictions to transborder flows of personal data should be proportionate to the risks presented, taking into account the sensitivity of the data, and the purpose and context of the processing.

The OPC’s 2009 Guidelines provide for an accountability-based transfer regime that squarely meets the OECD principles set forth in paragraphs 16 and 17 above. However, the OPC’s proposal to add a consent requirement is inconsistent with the principles set forth in paragraph 18. Given that the existing accountability-based protections for any transferred personal data will remain in place under the new policy, and given that the proposed consent requirement does not protect individuals from any additional risks that cannot be addressed by the required accountability measures, this new obstacle to cross-border transfers is disproportionate to any risks presented.

7. Requiring consent would undermine Canada’s commitments in relevant trade agreements

- **USMCA**

On September 30, 2018, the United States, Mexico and Canada (the Parties) announced a new trade agreement (the USMCA). If passed by the Parties’ legislatures, the USMCA would, among other things, require the Parties’ privacy frameworks to consider the principles and guidelines of relevant international bodies, such as the APEC Privacy Framework and the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. It would also formally recognize the APEC CBPRs as a valid mechanism within the respective legal systems of the Parties.

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Parties.\textsuperscript{32} Further, it provides that the Parties should promote “compatibility” between their legal regimes, including through the CBPR.\textsuperscript{33} It also states that the Parties “recognize the importance of [...] ensuring that any restrictions on cross-border flows of personal information are necessary and proportionate to the risks presented”.\textsuperscript{34}

CIPL believes that the OPC’s proposal to introduce a consent requirement for cross-border transfers runs at cross-purposes with the USMCA in at least two ways:

- it would reduce “compatibility” between the CBPR and Canada’s privacy framework in that it creates an additional inconsistency between the two; and

- it would introduce an obstacle to cross-border flows of personal information that is neither necessary nor proportionate to any risk presented, given that the personal data that is going to be transferred continues to be protected by the same accountability measures as before and asking for consent adds no additional protections to individuals.

b. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

This agreement, also known as TPP-11,\textsuperscript{35} came into effect on December 30, 2018. Its electronic commerce chapter\textsuperscript{36} includes commitments that protect the free flow of information across borders and minimize data localization requirements, while protecting Canada’s right to protect data for compelling public policy purposes. Similar to the cases of the APEC Privacy Framework, the CBPR and the USMCA, the proposal to add a consent requirement in the cross-border transfer context could run at cross-purposes with commitments set forth in the TPP-11.

c. EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)\textsuperscript{37} provides in Article 16.4 that “[e]ach Party should adopt or maintain laws, regulations or administrative measures for the protection of personal information of users engaged in electronic commerce and, when doing so, shall take into due consideration international standards of data protection of relevant international organisations of which both Parties are a member”. As described above, imposing a general consent requirement for transferring personal information across borders would be out of step with such international standards of data protection.

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at Article 19.8(6).
\textsuperscript{33} Id.
\textsuperscript{34} Id. at Article 19.8(3).
In summary, CIPL strongly recommends against the OPC’s proposed policy change to a consent model for cross-border transfers of personal information. Even in the short term, such a policy change will have lasting negative effects and will be unworkable in practice for the reasons given above. Instead, the focus should be on strengthening the accountability approach, in both the short term and the long term.

Conclusion

CIPL is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s reframed “Consultation on transfers for processing”. We look forward to further opportunities for dialogue on cross-border data flows or other privacy and data protection matters.

If you would like to discuss any of these comments or require additional information, please contact Bojana Bellamy, bbellamy@huntonAK.com; Markus Heyder, mheyder@huntonAK.com; Nathalie Laneret, nlaneret@huntonAK.com; or Sam Grogan, sgrogan@huntonAK.com.